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Abstract: We characterize single-valued solutions of transferable utility
cooperative games satisfying core selection and aggregate monotonicity. Fur-
thermore, we show that these two properties are compatible with individual
rationality, the dummy player property and the symmetry property. We nish
characterizing single-valued solutions satisfying these ve properties.
Resum: En aquest treball caracteritzem les solucions puntuals de jocs co-
operatius dutilitat transferible que compleixen selecció del core i monotonia
agregada. També mostrem que aquestes dues propietats són compatibles amb
la individualitat racional, la propietat del jugador fals i la propietat de sime-
tria. Finalment, caracteritzem les solucions puntuals que compleixen les cinc
propietats a lhora.
JEL classication: C71
Keywords: cooperative games, core, aggregate monotonicity, individual ratio-
nality, dummy player, symmetry.
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1 Introduction
The core (Gillies 1959) of a transferable utility cooperative game (a game) is
the set of feasible outcomes that can not be improved upon by any coalition of
players. Since the core of a game may be empty, generalizations and modica-
tions have been considered from the beginning (for details see Kannai 1992). A
single-valued solution satises core selection if it selects a core element for any
game with a non-empty core.
In the study of games, several monotonicity properties of single-valued so-
lutions have been introduced. Megiddo (1974) studies aggregate monotonicity,
which states that when the worth of the grand coalition increases whereas the
worths of all other coalitions remain the same, then everyones payo¤ should
weakly increase. Young (1985) considers a stronger property, called coalitional
monotonicity : if the worth of a given coalition increases whereas the worths of
all other coalitions remain the same, then the payo¤ of every member of that
coalition should weakly increase. He provides a ve-agent example showing that
this property and core selection are incompatible. Later, Housman and Clark
(1998) show the same incompatibility for a four-agent game.
On the other hand, core selection and aggregate monotonicity are compatible
on the domain of all games. The per-capita prenucleolus (Grotte 1970), a variant
of the classical prenucleolus (Schmeidler 1969), dened by means of the per-
capita excesses instead of the classical excesses, satises both properties (see for
example Young et al. 1982 or Moulin 1988). Calleja et al. (2009) study the
set of allocations attainable by single-valued solutions that satisfy core selection
and aggregate monotonicity: the aggregate-monotonic core.
However, as quoted in Young et al. (1982): "The per-capita prenucleolus1
may not be individually rational when the core is empty. While individual
rationality may simply be imposed as a constraint (as proposed in Grotte (1970,
1976)), another serious di¢ culty remains. The per-capita prenucleolus may
imply payments to dummies ... (a fact rst noted by Reinhard Selten)".
This paper is devoted to analyze the compatibility for single-valued solutions
of core selection and aggregate monotonicity, with other desirable and not too
demanding properties like individual rationality, the dummy player property and
symmetry. Peleg and Sudhölter (2003) contains an excellent summary on prop-
erties and known single-valued solutions. In Section 2 we introduce denitions
and preliminaries. In Section 3 we review already known single-valued solutions
and we see that none of them satises core selection, aggregate monotonic-
ity, individual rationality, the dummy player property and symmetry together.
Nevertheless, we show that these ve properties are compatible. In Section 4
we characterize single-valued solutions satisfying core selection and aggregate
monotonicity. Finally, in Section 5 we characterize those single-valued solu-
tions satisfying core selection, aggregate monotonicity, individual rationality,
the dummy player property and also the symmetry property.
1Weak nucleolus in the terminology used in Young et al. (1982)
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2 Preliminaries
We denote by N = f1; :::; ng a nite set of players. A coalition is a subset of
N and we denote by 2N the set of all coalitions in N . By jSj we denote the
cardinality of the coalition S  N . We use the symbol  for strict set inclusions
and  for weak set inclusions. By eS we denote the characteristic vector of RN
associated to coalition S  N , S 6= ?, i.e. eS;i = 1 if i 2 S and eS;i = 0 if i =2 S.
A transferable utility cooperative game (a game) is a pair (N; v) (v, for short)
where N is the set of players and v : 2N ! R is the characteristic function with
v(?) = 0. The number v(S) is the worth of coalition S, that is, what S can
achieve on its own. The set of all games with player set N is denoted by GN .
A vector x 2 RN is usually called a payo¤ vector or allocation, and each
component xi is interpreted as the allotment to player i 2 N . Given a payo¤
vector x 2 RN and a coalition S  N; S 6= ?, we write x(S) = Pi2S xi for
the payo¤ to coalition S, with x(?) = 0. We denote by  in RN the standard
partial order, i.e. x  y if xi  yi for all i 2 N .
The preimputation set of the game (N; v) consists of those payo¤vectors that
allocate the worth of the grand coalition: I(v) =

x 2 RN : x(N) = v(N)	.
The imputation set of the game (N; v) consists of those preimputations satis-
fying individual rationality: I(v) = fx 2 I(v) : xi  v(fig) for all i 2 Ng. A
game (N; v) is called essential if v(N)  Pi2N v(fig); that is if I(v) 6= ?. By
EN we denote the set of all essential games with player set N .
The core of the game (N; v) (Gillies, 1959) consists of those preimputations
for which every coalition S  N receives at least its worth: C(v) = fx 2 I(v) :
x(S)  v(S) for all S  Ng. By BN we denote the set of all balanced games
with player set N , that is, those with a non-empty core.
A single-valued solution on GN is a function F : GN ! RN such that
F (v) 2 I(v) for all v 2 GN .
In this paper, we deal with a number of properties of single-valued solutions
on GN , two of which are specially relevant in the paper: core selection and
aggregate monotonicity.
Denition 1 A single-valued solution, F : GN ! RN , satises core selection
(CS) if F (v) 2 C(v) for all v 2 BN .
In the following we will denote v <N v0 with v; v0 2 GN ; if v(S) = v0(S) for
all S  N and v(N) < v0(N).
Denition 2 (Megiddo, 1974) A single-valued solution, F : GN ! RN , satis-
es aggregate monotonicity (AM) if for all v; v0 2 GN with v <N v0, it holds
that F (v)  F (v0).
Other well known properties are individual rationality, the dummy player
property and symmetry.
Denition 3 A single-valued solution, F : GN ! RN , satises individual ra-
tionality (IR) if F (v) 2 I(v) for all v 2 EN .
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Note that a single-valued solution may satisfy core selection but not indi-
vidual rationality since it may select a non-individually rational allocation in a
game with an empty core.
Let (N; v) be a game. A player i 2 N is called a dummy player in (N; v)
if v(S [ fig)   v(S) = v(fig) for all S  Nn fig : A dummy player contributes
only his individual worth to all coalitions.
Denition 4 A single-valued solution, F : GN ! RN , satises the dummy
player property (DP) if Fi(v) = v(fig) for all v 2 GN and all dummy players
i 2 N in (N; v).
Let (N; v) be a game. Two players i; j 2 N are called symmetric players
in (N; v) if v(S [ fig) = v(S [ fjg) for all S  Nn fi; jg : Symmetric players
contribute the same to all coalitions they do not belong to.
Denition 5 A single-valued solution, F : GN ! RN , satises symmetry
(SYM) if Fi(v) = Fj(v) for all v 2 GN and any pair of symmetric players
i; j 2 N in (N; v).
3 Single-valued solutions and properties
Among several single-valued solutions for TU games dened on GN , the Shapley
value and the prenucleolus are maybe the most accepted. Let (N; v) be a game,
the Shapley value (Shapley 1953), (v) 2 RN , is dened by
i(v) =
X
SNnfig
jSj! (jN j   jSj   1)!
jN j! (v(S [ fig)  v(S)) for all i 2 N:
The Shapley value satises AM, although it does not satisfy CS. Additionally,
the Shapley value satises DP and SYM, but it does not satisfy IR.
The prenucleolus (Schmeidler 1969), (v) 2 RN , is the preimputation x 2
I(v) that lexicographically minimizes the vector of excesses e(S; x) = v(S)  
x(S), ? 6= S  N , when these are arranged in order of descending magnitude.
In comparison with the Shapley value, the prenucleolus satises CS, but it does
not satisfy AM. Additionally, the prenucleolus satises DP and SYM, but it
does not satisfy IR.
We are interested in combining core selection with aggregate monotonic-
ity. Although the Shapley value and the prenucleolus does not satisfy CS and
AM, these two properties are compatible on the domain of all games, since the
per-capita prenucleolus (Grotte 1970) satises both properties (see for example
Young et al. 1982 or Moulin 1988). The per-capita prenucleolus, (v) 2 RN ,
is the preimputation x 2 I(v) that lexicographically minimizes the vector of
per-capita excesses e(S; x) = v(S) x(S)jSj , ? 6= S  N , when these are arranged
in order of descending magnitude.
However, as suggested by Selten and quoted in Young et al. (1982), the
per-capita prenucleolus satises neither individual rationality nor the dummy
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player property. In Example 6 the per-capita prenucleolus satises neither IR
nor the DP property, even for superadditive games2 . On the other hand, the
per-capita prenucleolus satises SYM.
Example 6 Let (N; v) be the four-player game: v(f1g) = 0, v(f2g) = v(f3g) =
v(f4g) = v(f1; 2g) = v(f1; 3g) = v(f1; 4g) = 1, v(f2; 3g) = v(f2; 4g) = v(f3; 4g) =
v(f1; 2; 3g) = v(f1; 2; 4g) = v(f1; 3; 4g) = 10 and v(f2; 3; 4g) = v(N) = 12.
Note that the game is superadditive and player 1 is a dummy player in (N; v).
Now, let (N; v0) be such that v0(S) = v(S) for all S  N and v0(N) = 15.
Some computations3 yield to C(v0) = f(v0)g = f(0; 5; 5; 5)g and (v) =
( 0075; 4025; 4025; 4025). Then, (v) =2 I(v) and ;1(v) 6= 0 = v(f1g).
Table 1 summarizes whether or not the Shapley value, the prenucleolus and
the per-capita prenucleolus satisfy these ve properties.
Shapley value Prenucleolus Per-capita prenucleolus
CS  X X
AM X  X
IR    (example 6)
DP X X  (example 6)
S X X X
Table 1. Properties of solutions dened on GN
A natural and open question is whether or not there exists a single-valued
solution dened on GN satisfying the ve properties together.
Another possible approach is to restrict ourselves to essential games and to
solutions dened on the set of essential games. The nucleolus and the per-capita
nucleolus are solutions dened on EN .
The nucleolus, (v) 2 RN , is the imputation x 2 I(v) that lexicographically
minimizes the vector of excesses e(S; x) = v(S) x(S), ? 6= S  N , when these
are arranged in order of descending magnitude. In the following, we say that
the nucleolus satises a particular property (CS, AM, IR,:::) if it satises such
a property for essential games. Note that in fact, the nucleolus satises IR by
denition and, like the prenucleolus, it satises CS but not AM (Hokari 2000).
Additionally, the nucleolus satises DP and SYM.
The per-capita nucleolus, (v) 2 RN , is the imputation x 2 I(v) that lex-
icographically minimizes the vector of per-capita excesses e(S; x) = v(S) x(S)jSj ,
? 6= S  N , when these are arranged in order of descending magnitude. As
in the case of the nucleolus, we say that the per-capita nucleolus satises a
particular property (CS, AM, IR,:::) if it satises such a property for essential
games. The per-capita nucleolus satises IR by denition, moreover, impos-
ing individual rationality is enough to achieve the dummy player property too
2A game v is superadditive if and only if v(S)+v(T )  v(S[T ) for all S; T  N , S\T = ?.
3We use that for any two games v; v0 2 GN with v <N v0 it holds that (v0) = (v) +
v0(N) v(N)
jNj  eN (see Moulin 1988)
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(Derks and Haller 1999). Like the per-capita prenucleolus, it satises CS, but
unfortunately it does not satisfy AM. Example 7 shows that the per-capita nu-
cleolus does not satisfy aggregate monotonicity4 . Additionally, the per-capita
nucleolus also satises SYM.
Table 2 summarizes whether or not the nucleolus and the per-capita nucle-
olus satisfy these ve properties.
Nucleolus Per-capita nucleolus
CS X X
AM  (example 7)
IR X X
DP X X
S X X
Table 2. Properties of solutions dened on EN
Example 7 Let (N; v) be the ve-player game: v(f2; 3g) = v(f1; 4g) = 5;
v(f1; 2g) = v(f1; 2; 3g) = v(N) = 8 and v(S) = 0 otherwise. Now, let (N; v0) be
such that v0(S) = v(S) for all S  N and v0(N) = 10. Some computations5 yield
to (v0) = (5; 308; 102; 0; 0) and (v) = (4; 4; 0; 0; 0). Clearly, the per-capita nu-
cleolus does not satisfy aggregate monotonicity since 2(v0) = 308 < 4 = 2(v).
From the observation of Table 2, once again, it seems natural to ask if
there exists a single-valued solution dened on EN satisfying the ve properties
together. The answer to this question will appear as a consequence of the study
of the compatibility of these ve properties for solutions dened on GN .
The second part of this section is devoted to show that CS, AM, DP, IR and
SYM are compatible. With this aim, let us rst introduce two useful notions.
Let (N; v) be an arbitrary game. We denote by BNv the set of balanced games
that can be obtained from v by increasing or decreasing only the worth of the
grand coalition: BNv = fv0 2 BN : v0(S) = v(S) for all S  Ng. Notice that for
all v 2 GN , BNv is a non-empty subset of BN .
Denition 8 The root game (N; vr) associated to the game (N; v) is the small-
est game in BNv , i.e. vr 2 BNv and vr(N)  w(N) for all w 2 BNv . Additionally,
a game (N; v) is said to be rooted if v = vr.
We denote by GNroot the set of all rooted games. Notice that by denition,
C(w) 6= ? for all w 2 GNroot. As a consequence, any single-valued solution on
GN satisfying core selection must pick an allocation in the core of any rooted
game. Note also that any game v can be written in terms of its root game. If,
4We thank Javier Arin for fruitful conversations. In particular, for providing us Example
7. Recently, in Kleppe (2010), a PhD thesis defended on January 22, an example showing
that the per-capita nucleolus is not aggregate monotonic is also provided.
5We use the Kohlberg (1971) criterion for the nucleolus, which can be applied to the
per-capita nucleolus (see for example Derks and Haller 1999)
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by uN we denote the unanimity game associated to the grand coalition, where
uN (N) = 1 and uN (S) = 0 otherwise, then,
v = vr + (v(N)  vr(N))  uN ; (1)
where v(N) vr(N) does not need to be positive. Indeed, if v(N)  vr(N) then
C(v) 6= ?, while if v(N) < vr(N) then C(v) = ?:
The next notion is that of potential dummies.
Denition 9 Let (N; v) be a game. A player i 2 N is called a potential dummy
player in (N; v) if v(S [ fig)  v(S) = v(fig) for all S  Nn fig. By PD(v) we
denote the set of potential dummies in (N; v).
Note that if i 2 PD(v), player i may not be a dummy player in (N; v);
however, it will be a dummy player in a game (N; v0) with v0(S) = v(S) for all
S  Nn fig and v0(N) = v(fig) + v(Nn fig). Notice also that PD(v) could be
the empty set.
Theorem 10 Core selection, aggregate monotonicity, individual rationality, the
dummy player property and symmetry are compatible for single-valued solutions
dened on GN .
Proof. We rst show the following two claims:
Claim 1: Let w be a rooted game, if i; j 2 N are symmetric players in
(N;w) and i 2 PD(w) then j 2 PD(w).
Proof of Claim 1 : Let i; j be symmetric players in (N;w) and i 2 PD(w),
we have to show that w(S [ fjg)  w(S) = w(fjg) for all S  Nn fjg.
We distinguish two cases: rst, let it be S  Nn fjg with i =2 S: Then, it
follows that w(S [ fjg) w(S) = w(S [ fig) w(S) = w(fig) = w(fjg); where
the rst and third equalities hold since i; j are symmetric players in (N;w), and
the second equality holds since i 2 PD(w).
Second, let it be S  Nn fjg with i 2 S: Then, it follows that w(S [ fjg) 
w(S) = w(((Snfig) [ fig) [ fjg)   w((Snfig) [ fig) = w((Snfig) [ fjg) +
w(fig)   (w(Snfig) + w(fig)) = w((Snfig) [ fjg)   w(Snfig) = w((Snfig) [
fig)  w(Snfig) = w(fig) = w(fjg), where the fourth and sixth equalities hold
since i; j are symmetric players in (N;w), and the second and fth equalities
hold since i 2 PD(w).
Here nishes the proof of Claim 1.
Claim 2: Let w be a rooted game, then there exists x 2 C(w) such that
xi = w(fig) for all i 2 PD(w) and xi = xj for any pair i; j 2 N of symmetric
players in (N;w).
Proof of Claim 2 : Let w be a rooted game, we rst show that there exists
x 2 C(w) such that xi = w(fig) for all i 2 PD(w). In case PD(w) = ? it is
trivial. If PD(w) = N then w(S) =
P
i2S w(fig) for all S  N . Now, take
x = (w(f1g); w(f2g); :::; w(fng)), clearly x(S) = w(S) for all S  N , and being
(N;w) rooted we have w(N) =
P
i2N w(fig) and C(w) = f(w(f1g); w(f2g); :::;
8
w(fng))g.
In any other case, ? 6= PD(w)  N , take rst an arbitrary element y in
C(w). From y, dene a new allocation x 2 RN as follows:
xi =
(
w(fig) if i 2 PD(w);
yi +
P
i2PD(w)(yi w(fig))
jNnPD(w)j if i =2 PD(w):
Then clearly, x(N) = y(N) = w(N). Now, let S  N be an arbitrary coalition.
To show that x(S)  w(S), note rst that if PD(w)\S = fi1; i2; :::; isg, it follows
that w(S) = w(Sn fi1g) +w(fi1g) = w(Sn fi1; i2g) +w(fi1g) +w(fi2g) =    =
w(SnPD(w)) + P
i2PD(w)\S
w(fig). Consequently,
x(S) =
P
i2PD(w)\S
w(fig) + P
i2SnPD(w)

yi +
P
i2PD(w)(yi w(fig))
jNnPD(w)j

=
P
i2PD(w)\S
w(fig) + P
i2SnPD(w)
yi + jSnPD(w)j
P
i2PD(w)(yi w(fig))
jNnPD(w)j
 P
i2PD(w)\S
w(fig) + P
i2SnPD(w)
yi 
P
i2PD(w)\S
w(fig) + w(SnPD(w))
= w(S)
where the last two inequalities follow from y 2 C(w). Hence, we have shown
that for any rooted game w, there exists x 2 C(w) such that xi = w(fig) for all
i 2 PD(w).
Now, let y 2 C(w) be such that yi = w(fig) for all i 2 PD(w) and suppose
yi 6= yj for a pair of symmetric players i; j 2 N in (N;w). Dene y0 2 RN as
follows:
y0k =
8<: yk if k 6= i; j;yi if k = j;
yj if k = i;
which clearly belongs to C(w) too. From y and y0, we obtain z = 12 (y+y
0) which
satises z 2 C(w), zi = zj and by Claim 1, zi = w(fig) for all i 2 PD(w). From
z, and in a nite number of steps, we can obtain an allocation x 2 C(w) such
that xi = w(fig) for all i 2 PD(w) and xi = xj for any pair of symmetric
players i; j 2 N in (N;w).
Here nishes the proof of Claim 2.
To continue with the proof of the Theorem, we, next, dene a single-valued
solution on GN , F : GN ! RN , satisfying CS, AM, IR, DP and SYM. First,
for each w 2 GNroot we select an arbitrary xw 2 C(w) such that xwi = w(fig)
for all i 2 PD(w) and xwi = xwj for any pair of symmetric players i; j 2 N
in (N;w). Now, consider an arbitrary game v 2 GN . We introduce, associ-
ated to v, two allocations: let xvI 2 RN be the allocation dened by xvI =
(v(f1g); v(f2g); :::; v(fng)), and let xvI 2 RN be the allocation dened by xvI =
xvI + eNnPD(v). Then, to dene the solution, we distinguish three cases:
Case I) If vr(N) 6=
P
i2N v(fig), then dene
F (v) = xvI +
v(N) Pi2N v(fig)
vr(N) 
P
i2N v(fig)
(xvr   xvI )
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.
Case II) If vr(N) =
P
i2N v(fig) and PD(v) 6= N , then dene
:F (v) = xvI +
v(N) Pi2N v(fig)
jNnPD(v)j (x
v
I   xvI )
.
Case III) If vr(N) =
P
i2N v(fig) and PD(v) = N , then dene
F (v) = xvI +
v(N) Pi2N v(fig)
jN j eN
Note that in fact, if vr(N) 6=
P
i2N v(fig) we are taking the straight line
joining the allocations xvr and xvI . In this case, clearly vr(N) >
P
i2N v(fig)
and consequently xvr 6= xvI , moreover, since xvr 2 C(vr) then xvr  xvI . On
the other hand, if vr(N) =
P
i2N v(fig) note that since vr 2 BN , it holds
that C(vr) = f(v(f1g); v(f2g); :::; v(fng))g, or equivalently xvr = xvI . Then, we
distinguish two cases. In case PD(v) 6= N , we take the straight line joining
the allocations xvI and x
v
I , which are clearly di¤erent and, moreover, x
v
I  xvI .
While in case PD(v) = N , we divide equally among all players the amount
v(N)  vr(N) from the allocation xvI .
To see that this single-valued solution, F , satises core selection, let v 2 BN
and then v(N)  vr(N). Suppose rst that we are in case I), then clearly
v(N) Pi2N v(fig)
vr(N) 
P
i2N v(fig)  1 and consequently F (v)  x
vr , which follows from xvr 
xvI . Now, since x
vr 2 C(vr) we have that F (v) 2 C(v). Now, suppose we are
in case II), then
v(N) Pi2N v(fig)
jNnPD(v)j  0 since v(N)  vr(N) =
P
i2N v(fig), and
consequently F (v)  xvI which follows from xvI  xvI . Now, since xvI 2 C(vr) we
have that F (v) 2 C(v). Finally, in case III) we have v(N) 
P
i2N v(fig)
jN j  0 since
v(N)  vr(N) =
P
i2N v(fig), and consequently F (v)  xvI and F (v) 2 C(v)
since xvI 2 C(vr).
To see that this single-valued solution, F , satises aggregate monotonicity,
let v; v0 2 GN with v <N v0. Then, clearly v(N) < v0(N), and it is easy to see
by a direct observation of the solution that in any of the three di¤erent cases
we have F (v)  F (v0).
To see that this single-valued solution, F , satises individual rationality,
let v 2 EN ; then clearly v(N)  Pi2N v(fig). Now suppose that vr(N) 6=P
i2N v(fig), in this case,
v(N) Pi2N v(fig)
vr(N) 
P
i2N v(fig)  0 and together with the fact that
xvr  xvI , it follows that F (v)  xvI and consequently F (v) 2 I(v). On the other
hand, if vr(N) =
P
i2N v(fig) then
v(N) Pi2N v(fig)
jNnPD(v)j  0 if we are in case II) and
v(N) Pi2N v(fig)
jN j  0 in case III), and consequently F (v)  xvI and F (v) 2 I(v).
Symmetry is satised since if v 2 GN have a pair of symmetric players
i; j 2 N , then i; j are clearly symmetric players in vr too. Consequently, since
xvr satises xvri = x
vr
j , x
v
I satises x
v
I;i = v(fig) = v(fjg) = xvI;j and xvI , by
Claim 1, satises xvI;i = x
v
I;j for any pair of symmetric players i; j 2 N in vr, it
follows that Fi(v) = Fj(v).
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Finally, to check the dummy player property, let i 2 N be a dummy player
in a game (N; v). Note rst that in fact only a potential dummy can become
a dummy player and that PD(vr) = PD(v); and consequently i 2 PD(vr).
Suppose now we are in case I), then we have xvri = v(fig) since i 2 PD(vr)
and xvI;i = v(fig); and hence, Fi(v) = v(fig). Similarly, in case II), we have
xvI;i = x
v
I;i = v(fig) since i 2 PD(vr), and consequently, Fi(v) = v(fig). Case
III) deserves more attention. Let i 2 N be a dummy player in a game (N; v) and
vr(N) =
P
i2N v(fig) with PD(vr) = N . Then, since v(N) = v(Nn fig)+v(fig)
and, as shown in Claim 2, v(S) = vr(S) =
P
i2S vr(fig) for all S  N , we have
v(N) =
P
i2N v(fig). Hence v = vr and Fi(v) = Fi(vr) = v(fig).
Corollary 11 Core selection, aggregate monotonicity, individual rationality,
the dummy player property and symmetry are compatible for single-valued solu-
tions dened on EN .
Proof. It follows easily from the proof of Theorem 10 dening the same single-
valued solution restricted to essential games EN .
4 Core selection and aggregate monotonicity
The main issue of the second part of the paper is to characterize single-valued
solution satisfying CS, AM, IR, DP and SYM, and for this aim it is crucial
the characterization of the single-valued solutions satisfying core selection and
aggregate monotonicity. In order to characterize the single-valued solutions on
GN that satisfy CS and AM, we rst introduce monotonic stable systems.
A map  : GNroot ! RN is a stable root-selection if (w) 2 C(w) for all
w 2 GNroot. A stable root-selection selects a core element for any rooted game.
The family of stable root-selections on GNroot is denoted by 
N .
A monotonic curve is a function  : R ! RN with Pi2N i(s) = s for all
s 2 R, (0) = (0; : : : ; 0) and (s)  (t) for each pair s; t 2 R with s  t.
Note, that a monotonic curve will assign non-negative (non-positive) vectors to
positive (negative) real numbers. By N we denote the family of monotonic
curves in RN .
A monotonic curve system is a map   : GNroot ! N . A monotonic curve
system selects a monotonic curve, not necessarily the same, for all rooted games.
For simplicity we will denote  (w) by w. By MCSN we denote the family of
monotonic curve systems on GNroot.
Denition 12 A monotonic stable system is a pair (; ) with  2 N and
  2MCSN .
A monotonic stable system selects, for any rooted game w 2 GNroot, an
element in the core of the game w, and a monotonic curve associated to the
game w. Note that these selections can vary from one rooted game to another.
Note also that associated to any monotonic stable system (; ) 2 N 
MCSN , we can dene a single-valued solution F;  : GN ! RN on GN by
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F; (v) = (vr) + 
vr (v(N)   vr(N)). Moreover, any single-valued solution
on GN ; F : GN ! RN , could be described by an e¢ cient, not necessarily
stable, selection for all rooted games, and a curve system, selecting a curve, not
necessarily monotonic, for all rooted games.
In next theorem, we characterize the single-valued solutions satisfying core
selection and aggregate monotonicity using monotonic stable systems.
Theorem 13 A single-valued solution, F : GN ! RN ; satises core selection
and aggregate monotonicity if and only if there exists a monotonic stable system
(; ) 2 N MCSN , such that F = F; .
Proof. Let F;  : GN ! RN be such that (; ) 2 N MCSN . Then it is
straightforward that F;  satises core selection and aggregate monotonicity.
Now, let F : GN ! RN be a core selection and aggregate monotonic single-
valued solution. Dene  : GNroot ! RN by (w) = F (w) for all w 2 GNroot,
by core selection F (w) 2 C(w) for all w 2 GNroot; hence  2 N . Next, dene
  : GNroot ! N by w(s) = F (w+s uN ) F (w) for all s 2 R and all w 2 GNroot.
Clearly, for every w 2 GNroot we have w(0) = (0; : : : ; 0),
P
i2N 
w
i (s) = s for all
s 2 R and, for each pair s; t 2 R with s  t it holds that
w(s) = F (w + s  uN )  F (w)
 F (w + t  uN )  F (w)
= w(t),
where the inequality follows since F satises aggregate monotonicity. Conse-
quently, w is a monotonic curve for all w 2 GNroot and then   2MCSN . Hence,
(; ) is a monotonic stable system.
To nish, let us show that F;  = F with  2 N and   2 MCSN as
dened above. Let v be an arbitrary game, then
F; (v) = (vr) + 
vr (v(N)  vr(N))
= F (vr) + F (vr + (v(N)  vr(N))  uN )  F (vr) = F (v).
where the last equality follows from equation (1).
5 Dummy player, individual rationality and sym-
metry
Next, we characterize all single-valued solutions satisfying any combination of
CS and AM with IR, and/or DP and/or SYM. We will start with the character-
ization of the single-valued solutions on GN satisfying core selection, aggregate
monotonicity and individual rationality. First, we need to dene individually
rational adapted monotonic stable systems.
Denition 14 We say that a monotonic stable system, (; ) 2 N MCSN ,
is individually rational adapted if for all w 2 GNroot it holds that xwI   (w) 2
Im(w), where xwI = (w(f1g); :::w(fng)) and Im(w) denotes the image of w.
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Note that for a given rooted game w, an individually rational adapted
monotonic stable system imposes that the monotonic curve w contains the
vector xwI   (w). This will be crucial to ensure that a solution dened by
a monotonic stable system selects precisely xwI in the game wI , dened as
wI(S) = w(S) for all S  N and wI(N) =
P
i2N w(fig).
With individually rational adapted monotonic stable systems we character-
ize single-valued solutions satisfying core selection, aggregate monotonicity and
individual rationality.
Theorem 15 A single-valued solution, F : GN ! RN ; satises core selection,
aggregate monotonicity and individual rationality if and only if there exists an
individually rational adapted monotonic stable system, (; ) 2 N MCSN ,
such that F = F; .
Proof. This is straightforward following the proof of Theorem 13 and showing
the next two points:
1) If F;  : GN ! RN is such that (; ) 2 N MCSN with (; ) being
individually rational adapted then F;  satises IR. Let v 2 EN , then F; (v) =
(vr)+
vr (v(N) vr(N))  (vr)+vr
 P
i2N v(fig)  vr(N)

= (vr)+x
vr
I  
(vr) = x
vr
I . Here, the inequality follows from 
vr being a monotonic curve and
v(N) Pi2N v(fig). The second equality holds since xvrI  (vr) 2 Im(vr ) and
clearly, the only s 2 R such that vr (s) = xvrI  (vr) is s =
P
i2N v(fig) vr(N).
Hence F; (v)  xvrI and F; satises IR .
2) If F : GN ! RN is a single-valued solution satisfying CS, AM and IR
then (; ) 2 N  MCSN dened as in the proof of Theorem 13, that is,
(w) = F (w) and w(s) = F (w+ s uN ) F (w) for all s 2 R and all w 2 GNroot,
is individually rational adapted. Let w 2 GNroot, and let wI 2 GN be such
that wI(S) = w(S) for all S  N and wI(N) =
P
i2N w(fig), then since
I(wI) = fxwI g and F satises IR, it follows that F (wI) = xwI . Consequently,
w(wI(N) w(N)) = F (w+ (wI(N) w(N))  uN ) F (w) = F (wI) F (w) =
xwI   (w), and xwI   (w) 2 Im(w).
Let us now show an incompatibility result. First, we dene a property that
we call equal surplus division, which is a stronger version of AM.
Denition 16 A single-valued solution, F : GN ! RN , satises equal surplus
division (ESD) if for all v; v0 2 GN with v <N v0, it holds that F (v0) = F (v) +
v0(N) v(N)
jN j eN .
A single-valued solution, F : GN ! RN , that satises CS and IR can-
not satisfy ESD. Consider, for instance, the three-player game w(f1; 2g) =
w(f1; 3g) = w(f1; 2; 3g) = 1 and w(S) = 0 otherwise, which is clearly a rooted
game and satises w(N) >
P
i2N w(fig). This game has a unique core ele-
ment which is (1; 0; 0), and any single-valued solution, F : GN ! RN , satis-
fying CS must hold F (w) = (1; 0; 0). On the other hand, note that players
2 and 3 receive exactly their individual worth. Now, suppose that F satises
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ESD too, and take the game v 2 GN with v(S) = w(S) for all S  N and
v(N) = 12 . Then F (v) = (
5
6 ;  16 ;  16 ) =2 I(v) and consequently F does not
satisfy IR. In fact, if F satises ESD then w(s) = sjN jeN and clearly when
s =
P
i2N w(fig)   w(N) =   12 we have w(s) = (  16 ;  16 ;  16 ) 6= xwI   F (w)
and consequently xwI  F (w) =2 Im(w). It can be easily checked that the same
happens in Example 6. We then state the following corollary.
Corollary 17 For jN j  3 there is no single-valued solution on GN that satis-
es core selection, equal surplus division and individual rationality.
Let us remark that among the single-valued solutions presented in Section 2,
those that satisfy AM, the Shapley value and the per-capita prenucleolus, satisfy
ESD too. However, to dene a solution satisfying CS, AM and IR we cannot
use a solution which satises ESD. In Theorem 10 we provide a single-valued
solution satisfying these three properties, but to do it we lose the simplicity that
ESD solutions allow.
To continue, we will next characterize the single-valued solutions on GN sat-
isfying core selection, aggregate monotonicity and the dummy player property.
To this aim, we rst show that potential dummy players satisfy an important
property which we call the dummy coincidence property. Suppose an arbitrary
game v with a pair of potential dummies i; j 2 PD(v). Obviously, player i will
become a dummy player in a game v0, obtained from v, only varying the worth
of the grand coalition. It is also obvious that player j will become a dummy
player in a game v00, obtained also from v, only varying the worth of the grand
coalition. What is somehow surprising is that at the end the games v0 and v00
will be the same game. In the next Lemma we state and prove the dummy
coincidence property.
Lemma 18 Let i 2 N be a dummy player in (N; v) and j 2 PD(v), then j
is also a dummy player in (N; v) and v(N) =
P
i2PD(v) v(fig) + v(NnPD(v)).
Moreover, if v 2 BN then v = vr.
Proof. Let (N; v) be a game, i a dummy player in (N; v) and j 2 PD(v),
then v(N)   v(Nn fig) = v(fig). Take S = Nn fi; jg, since j 2 PD(v), then
v((Nn fi; jg)[fjg) v(Nn fi; jg) = v(fjg). Hence, v(N) = v(fig)+v(Nn fig) =
v(fig)+v(fjg)+v(Nn fi; jg). Moreover, since i is a dummy player, we also have
v((Nn fi; jg) [ fig)   v(Nn fi; jg) = v(fig) and, consequently, v(Nn fi; jg) =
v(Nn fjg)  v(fig).
To show that j is a dummy player in (N; v) it is enough to see that
v(N)  v(Nn fjg) = v(fig) + v(fjg) + v(Nn fi; jg)  v(Nn fjg)
= v(fig) + v(fjg) + (v(Nn fjg)  v(fig))  v(Nn fjg)
= v(fjg):
Consequently, any potential dummy in the game (N; v) is also a dummy
player in the game (N; v) and, then v(N) =
P
i2PD(v) v(fig) + v(NnPD(v)).
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Finally, to prove that if v 2 BN then v = vr, note that for any v 2 BN we
have v(N)  vr(N). Now, suppose v(N) =
P
i2PD(v) v(fig) + v(NnPD(v)) >
vr(N); this inequality, clearly, involves a contradiction with vr being balanced.
Hence, v(N) = vr(N) and v = vr.
The above lemma has some important consequences. If one considers an
arbitrary game v with a set of potential dummies, PD(v), and increases or de-
creases only the worth of the grand coalition, at a particular value, the valueP
i2PD(v) v(fig) + v(NnPD(v)), all potential dummies will become dummy
players. Note also that PD(v) = PD(vr) and v(S) = vr(S) for all S  N ,
then, for simplicity, and for a given rooted game w 2 GNroot, we denote sD =P
i2PD(w) w(fig) + w(NnPD(w))

 w(N). Let us now dene dummy adapted
monotonic stable systems.
Denition 19 We say that a monotonic stable system, (; ) 2 N MCSN ,
is dummy adapted if for all w 2 GNroot it holds that wi (sD) = w(fig)   i(w)
for all i 2 PD(w).
With dummy adapted monotonic stable systems we characterize the single-
valued solutions satisfying core selection, aggregate monotonicity and the dummy
player property.
Theorem 20 A single-valued solution, F : GN ! RN , satises core selection,
aggregate monotonicity and the dummy player property if and only if there exists
a dummy adapted monotonic stable system, (; ) 2 N MCSN , such that
F = F; .
Proof. This is straightforward following the proof of Theorem 13 and showing
the next two points:
1) If F;  : GN ! RN is such that (; ) 2 N MCSN with (; ) being
dummy adapted then F;  satises DP. Let i 2 N be a dummy player in game
(N; v). If v 2 BN , by Lemma 18, v = vr, and then we have F; (v) = (vr) 2
C(v). Now, since F; (v) is a core element it follows that F; i (v) = v(fig).
If v =2 BN , then F; i (v) = i(vr) + vri (v(N)   vr(N)) = i(vr) + vri (sD) =
i(vr)+v(fig) i(vr) = v(fig), where the second equality follows from Lemma
18 and the denition of sD, and the third equality from (; ) being dummy
adapted. Hence, F;  satises the dummy player property.
2) If F : GN ! RN is a single-valued solution satisfying CS, AM and DP then
(; ) 2 N MCSN dened as in the proof of Theorem 13 is dummy adapted.
Let w 2 GNroot and i 2 PD(w), then wi (sD) = Fi (w + sD  uN )   Fi(w) =
w(fig)  i(w), which follows since F satises the dummy player property, and
by Lemma 18 and the denition of sD, player i becomes a dummy player in the
game (N;w + sD  uN ).
Again, an incompatibility result appears. A single-valued solution, F :
GN ! RN , that satises CS and DP cannot satisfy equal surplus division. Con-
sider, for instance the three-player rooted game w(f1g) = 0, w(f1; 2; 3g) = 2 and
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w(S) = 1 otherwise, that satises w(N) >
P
i2PD(w) w(fig) + w(NnPD(w))
and where player 1 is the only potential dummy player. This game has a unique
core element (0; 1; 1) and any single-valued solution, F : GN ! RN , satisfying
CS must hold F (w) = (0; 1; 1). On the other hand, note that player 1 receives
exactly his individual worth. Now, suppose that F satises ESD too, and take
the game v 2 GN with v(S) = w(S) for all S  N and v(N) = 1. Then F (v) =
(  13 ; 23 ; 23 ), but the game v satises v(N) =
P
i2PD(w) w(fig) + w(NnPD(w))
and consequently, player 1 is a dummy player in (N; v). Hence, F does not sat-
isfy DP. In fact, if F satises ESD then w(s) = sjN jeN , and clearly when s = sD
and player 1 becomes a dummy player, he cannot receive exactly w(f1g). Again,
this is also what happens in Example 6. We then state the following corollary.
Corollary 21 For jN j  3 there is no single-valued solution on GN that satis-
es core selection, equal surplus division and the dummy player property.
We want to remark here again that to dene a solution satisfying CS, AM
and DP we cannot use a solution which satises equal surplus division, and
this is a reason why the single-valued solution we provide in Theorem 10 lacks
simplicity.
Finally, we characterize the single-valued solutions satisfying core selection,
aggregate monotonicity and symmetry. Note that given an arbitrary game (N; v)
with a pair of symmetric players i; j 2 N , then i; j 2 N are also symmetric
players in a new game (N; v0) with v(S) = v0(S) for all S  N and v(N) 6=
v0(N). First, we need to dene symmetry adapted monotonic stable systems.
Denition 22 We say that a monotonic stable system, (; ) 2 N MCSN ,
is symmetry adapted if for all w 2 GNroot and any pair i; j 2 N of symmetric
players in (N;w) it holds that i(w) = j(w) and wi (s) = 
w
j (s) for all s 2 R.
With symmetry adapted monotonic stable systems we characterize the single-
valued solutions satisfying core selection, aggregate monotonicity and symmetry.
Theorem 23 A single-valued solution, F : GN ! RN ; satises core selection,
aggregate monotonicity and symmetry if and only if there exists a symmetry
adapted monotonic stable system, (; ) 2 N MCSN , such that F = F; .
Proof. This is straightforward following the proof of Theorem 13, and showing
the next two points:
1) It is easy to see that if F;  : GN ! RN is such that (; ) 2 NMCSN
with (; ) being symmetry adapted then F;  satises SYM.
2) If F : GN ! RN is a single-valued solution satisfying CS, AM and SYM
then (; ) 2 N MCSN dened as in the proof of Theorem 13 is symmetry
adapted. Let w 2 GNroot and i; j 2 N a pair of symmetric players in (N;w),
then it follows that i(w) = Fi(w) = Fj(w) = j(w) from the symmetry of F .
Moreover, wi (s) = Fi (w + s  uN )   Fi(w) = Fj (w + s  uN )   Fj(w) = wj (s)
for all s 2 R, since i; j are also symmetric players in the game (N;w + s  uN )
for all s 2 R and F satises symmetry.
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To conclude, we state without a proof (it follows easily from Theorems 13, 15,
20 and 23) the following corollary, in which we characterize the set of all single-
valued solutions on GN that satisfy core selection, aggregate monotonicity, the
dummy player property, individual rationality and symmetry together. From
Theorem 10, we know the existence of solutions satisfying these ve properties
together. In fact, we know that the conditions we impose on monotonic stable
systems to get IR, DP and SYM are all of them compatible.
Corollary 24 A single-valued solution, F : GN ! RN ; satises core selec-
tion, aggregate monotonicity, the dummy player property, individual rationality
and symmetry if and only if there exists an individually rational, dummy and
symmetry adapted monotonic stable system, (; ) 2 N MCSN , such that
F = F; .
As a nal remark, note that to characterize the set of single-valued solutions
satisfying the combination of CS and AM with IR, and/or DP, and/or SYM, it
is enough to impose to monotonic stable systems, (; ) 2 N MCSN , the
corresponding conditions to be individually rational, and/or dummy, and/or
symmetry adapted.
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